What Feels Right, Objectively:
A Sentimentalist Rebuttal to Prinz's Sentimentalist Moral Relativism

Jake Davis (CUNY Graduate Center)

1 INTRODUCTION

On the sentimentalist line that Prinz (2007) borrows from Hume, moral concepts are response dependent properties. In particular, the values that are expressed in moral judgment are constituted by emotional dispositions – sentiments. Prinz takes this sentimentalist line of thought to a natural conclusion, though interestingly not one it seems Hume shared. Different cultures and subcultures inculcate varied and opposing moral sentiments. If sentiments are the truth-makers for moral facts, then there are varied and opposing moral facts. Indeed, Prinz suggests that there are no moral truths that hold for all human beings. Moral relativism may be a painful truth, since it does not allow us the comfort of privileging any particular system of morality. Nonetheless, hiding from this truth is hardly a solution; moral relativism is a fact we ought to learn to live with.

I develop in this paper a sentimentalist approach to morality that does not lead to moral relativism. While recent theorists of meta-ethics extensively employ (and some cases generate) research within moral psychology, they have not in general made use of a complementary set of research programs within cognitive psychology and affective neuroscience, investigating mechanisms of attention and emotional awareness. Prinz, for one, has developed elsewhere empirically oriented accounts of attention and consciousness (Prinz 2005a; Prinz 2010), emotion (Prinz 2004), and emotional consciousness (Prinz 2005b). Nonetheless, prominent sentimentalist theorists, Prinz included, have not made full use of recent work on the role of attention and emotional consciousness to refine their accounts of moral epistemology. Drawing on empirical research on attention training as a means of developing emotional awareness, I argue that our ability to converge on a thorough and unbiased awareness of the relative painfulness of various types of emotion can ground a circumscribed set of universal truths about how we ought to live, while leaving many other aspects of how we ought to live open to cultural determination.

2 PAINFUL EMOTIONS

I start from the intuitive claim that all human beings have strong preferences against being subject to unpleasant internal states such as painful emotions, and that we express this attitude in evaluative claims about which states are good and bad. Put another way, we share at least one value, that against painful internal states, and thereby a relative value in favor of pleasurable emotions over painful ones.

2.1 Valence and Preference

The notion of affective valence, as it is used in recent empirical literature, often conflates a number of separable aspects (Colombetti 2005). Emotions such as joy are often associated with approach (towards a pleasurable object), and emotions such as sadness with

withdrawal. But the dimension of approach and withdrawal needs to be separated from the hedonic tone of an emotion. Both craving and anger motivate approach behavior, for instance, but it does not follow that these are pleasurable; on my view they are both unpleasant. Indeed, it is the unpleasantness of craving that motivates us so powerfully to obtain whatever will appease it. Conversely, I suggest that the feeling of goodwill has a positive hedonic tone, and that we can be motivated to act in benevolent ways simply because it feels so good.

For this account to be viable, it is crucial that certain physiological reactions, for instance those involved in ill-will, have a negative hedonic tone, for all human beings. Importantly, I do not deny that ill-will is pleasurable for some of us, in addition to being unpleasant. We can like pain, and more generally we can have a preference for things that are negatively hedonically valenced. One way to make sense of this conflict is to suggest that certain physiological reactions have an intrinsic negative hedonic tone, independent of whether we have a preference for or against these reactions. There empirical as well as phenomenological reasons to be skeptical of such an account of hedonic tone as intrinsic; Prinz (2004) suggests that the (un)pleasantness of a perceptual objects consists in nothing more than that we (dis)like it. That is, our own preferences determine our pain and pleasure. I am agnostic on this question. However, if pleasantness is determined just by our preferences, then I hold that some preferences must be hard-wired and universal, for instance a preference against tissue damage in virtue of which it is negatively hedonically valenced. Thus I suggest that the reason the masochist gets pleasure from tissue damage is that she has a preference for something that is actually painful. We can make sense of this either by saying that she has a preference for something that is intrinsically painful, or else by saying that she has conflicting preferences. For my purposes here, either will do.

The pleasure of feeling goodwill can on some occasions have a kind of purity, I suggest, in virtue of not being mixed with painful feelings. In contrast, the pleasure that one might take in feeling ill-will towards an enemy will be always mixed with the pain of the physiological reaction involved in ill-will. It is not the case, however, that we are aware of the negative hedonic valence of emotional reactions such as ill-will on every occasion we have such an emotion. Indeed, it is crucial to my account that we often are not accurately aware of the pain and pleasure or our own emotions, but that with the appropriate training of attention, we can come to feel and to know the relative painfulness of various emotion types.

2.2 Some Improper Parts of Emotional Reactions

For the specific practical purpose of giving an account of episodes of joy, resentment, and so on in philosophical or moral psychology, I suggest, we can proceed by identifying the psychological and physiological changes present during these episodes, as well as the activity in the brain or elsewhere in the body that sustains these effects throughout the emotional episode. We need not establish which of these aspects, if any, corresponds to the folk-psychological notion of emotion. Such an approach can address the commonalities and differences between feelings of ill-will and feelings of benevolence, say, while remaining agnostic about whether emotions are a natural kind. This allows us to avoid debates about whether emotions are essentially cognitive or instead body-based, and

whether emotions are essentially conscious. This does not mean that substantive aspects of research into emotional reactions are left out; on the contrary, the nature and causal relations of somatic and cognitive aspects may well come into more precise focus when not lumped together, for instance. This approach also allows us to ask whether psychological processes that are especially associated with emotional reactions, such as affect valence, might nonetheless be present in cases where we would not be tempted to attribute an emotional reaction. And indeed, recent empirical work suggests that affect valence is pervasive in human psychology, being implicated in evaluative decision-making about everything from consumer choices to moral judgments (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; Haidt 2007).

On this an approach we might think of emotional episodes as often involving a cycle of initial perception, triggering associated affective and somatic responses. These in turn can trigger thoughts, which may in turn trigger further affective and somatic reactions, and so on. The central point of this model is that while we cannot change the fact that being a conscious being interacting with the world involves both pleasure and pain, we can take responsibility for the pain and pleasure we cause ourselves in reacting to the world. There horrible things that happen in the world, and so on many occasions to perceive things as they are is to perceive things as painful. Put in terms of the model sketched above, an initial perception may often be associated with negative affect. My account makes an empirical prediction that these initial appraisals need not lead to further proliferation in cycles of emotional reaction.

This distinction between initial appraisal and subsequent cycles of emotional elaboration is of central importance for my purposes here, because it allows us to separate two questions about emotion that are apt to be conflated. The first is a question of warrant; we can ask whether an initial perception and its associated affective valence get the world right. Empathetic pain in response to seeing another's pain is unpleasant, but it does not follow on my account that we ought not to feel empathy. The project I undertake here is to provide a means to evaluate the various possible ways of further reacting to an initial painful or pleasurable perception of things in the world. Any way of reacting strengthens habits of reacting in that same way, and the ethics of emotion that I seek to develop suggests that some ways of reacting to pain and pleasure ought to be cultivated, and others ought to be attenuated. The means I suggest for discerning between these two is pragmatic, even hedonist. Some ways of responding to pain and pleasure feel much better than others.

3 Feeling and Knowing

The changes in neural activation and peripheral physiology underlying emotions can be fruitfully investigated (LeDoux 2000). In order to bracket the controversy over whether the term "emotion" should refer only to consciously experienced states, I will refer to affective reactions in general as "emotional". It is then a further question, but also an empirical one, under what conditions various aspects of these emotional reactions come to be consciously experienced, in the sense that there is "something it is like" for one to be undergoing these processes (Nagel 1974; Lambie and Marcel 2002).On the view I endorse below, only a subset of those stimuli that are consciously experienced become en-

coded in working memory and available for report and other explicit cognitive processing. To mark this difference, I will refer to subjects as aware of or knowing of their emotional reactions only in cases where they have the ability to explicitly report, recall, or deliberate on these emotions.

3.1 Attention as Unmasking

It is intuitively plausible that there is some relation between, on the one hand, attention to the somatic, affective, cognitive, and volitional aspects of our emotional reactions, and on the other our conscious experience of these aspects. Dehaene and colleagues suggest that attention is "prerequisite" for consciousness (Dehaene and Naccache 2001, 7–8). Their global-workspace theory of consciousness is motivated in part by appeal to studies on backward and simultaneous masking, especially in vision. When a stimulus is salient, it can mask others such that subjects do not report being conscious of weaker concurrent stimuli. When attention is cued, subjects are able to report on stimuli that were previously masked and unconscious.

However, global-workspace accounts illicitly collapse conscious experience with the ability to report a stimulus, in advance of the empirical data, as Ned Block (1995; 2007) has argued persuasively. On Block's view, we need to make a tripartite distinction between perceptions that are unconscious, those that are phenomenologically conscious, and those that are available to cognitive functions such as report, deliberation, and storage in long-term memory. Agreeing with this tripartite division, Prinz (2005a; 2010) makes the ambitious claim that attention is both necessary and sufficient for conscious experience, functioning to make perceptual information available for encoding in working memory. He thus holds that the somatic perceptions involved in our emotional "gut reactions" are consciously experienced only when they are modulated by attention (Prinz 2005b).

For Prinz, attention is necessary for phenomenal consciousness in a constitutive sense. If so, we will only be aware of the painfulness of emotional reactions to which we pay attention. It is worth noting in passing, nonetheless, that a more easily defensible account of the relation between attention and consciousness can deliver this same conclusion. Prinz's account neglects two crucial distinctions. First, cognitive scientists distinguish a number of different types of attention. Jin Fan, Michael Posner, and colleagues for instance, have distinguished top-down selective attention from the alerting mechanisms necessary for sustained vigilance, using behavioral as well as neurophysiological measures (Fan et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2005; Fan et al. 2007). Given these distinctions, it is not clear what Prinz's general claim that attentional modulation is necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness amounts to.

Secondly, Prinz follows Block in conceiving of phenomenal consciousness as a state of experiencing in a rich and vivid way certain objects or properties, for instance a state of seeing red. Without such a notion of phenomenally conscious states as essentially including modality-specific content, it would make little sense to suggest, as Block does, that visual phenomenal consciousness might be realized by certain patterns of recurrent neural activity in visual areas of the brain (Block 2005). Prinz likewise argues that particular perceptual representations become phenomenally consciousness only through the modu-

lation of attentional mechanisms. In contrast, Parvizi and Damasio suggest that there is a basic, core level of consciousness, dependent on the thalamus and brainstem, that occurs independently of selective attentional processes in higher cortical areas (Parvizi and Damasio 2001). This core or ground floor level of consciousness depends on a basic kind of alerting function distinct from the higher-level mechanisms of selective attention that come into play in determining what one is conscious of. On this view, the fact *that* there is a phenomenal feel—the fact that there is something it is like for a subject—depends on the basic alerting function. In contrast, the *content* of phenomenal consciousness—what it is like for a subject—depends also on how this consciousness is directed to particular objects and properties through selective attention. Put another way, the particular contents of phenomenal consciousness can be seen as modifications or modulations of a basal level of awareness dependent on the alerting function.

This distinction between the content and the occurrence of consciousness allows for a more easily defensible account of the relation between selective attention and consciousness experience. On the "biased-competition" model of attention developed by Desimone and Duncan (1995), representations in early sensory areas compete with one another for access to downstream resources, such as the mechanisms involved in conscious experience as well as those involved in cognitive access. The early visual system is tuned to pick up particular types of stimuli: motion, sharp edges, bright colors, and so on; for this same sort of reason, in the somatosensory modality, more intense stimuli tend to win out over weaker ones. But, crucially, top-down modulation by short-term task-goals and other representations in working memory also serves to bias these competitions in early sensory areas in favor of certain representations.

This approach allows that under normal conditions, where subjects are presented with numerous stimuli competing for processing resources, selective attention functions to make certain of these conscious. On this view, however, selective attention is not even partly constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. In the absence of competing stimuli, no modulation by the cortical areas involved in selective attention is necessary for a subject to be conscious of a particular stimuli. Understanding selective attention as unmasking selected stimuli provides a defensible account of how we consciously feel certain somatic and affective aspects of emotional reactions, and how these reactions can further come to be available for report, recall, and deliberation.

3.2 Developing Unbiased Emotional Awareness

In discussing the relations of attention, consciousness, and cognitive access, I draw in particular on recent empirical research on one kind of attention training, "mindfulness" meditation. Mindfulness practice can be broadly characterized by the aim to cultivate a clear awareness of one's own bodily, affective, mental, and perceptual processes, as they are occurring. The practice is derived from Buddhist sources, especially Theravada Buddhist teachers from countries such Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, it is the secular form of mindfulness practice pioneered in hospital settings by Jon Kabat-Zinn, and now widespread in clinical settings around the world, that has been the subject of the majority scientific investigations in this area. Drawing behavioral and neurophysiological evidence of changes correlated with mindfulness practice in emotional awareness and

emotional biases, I emphasize the potential of this type of attention training to help us to correct the mistakes we make about the relative value of various emotion types.

Initial results do indicate that increases in bodily awareness due to mindfulness practice correlate with increases in emotional awareness. Comparing the effects of different types of bodily awareness training on subjective awareness of emotional response, Sze et al. (2010) found that meditators showed significantly more coherence between physiological changes and subjective awareness of emotional response than dancers and controls, and dancers showed an intermediate level of coherence. In reporting similar evidence of increased interoceptive awareness in a sample of female undergraduates engaged in mindfulness training, Silverstein et al. (2011) suggest that women who were distracted by emotionally-driven self-evaluative thoughts were much slower in registering their bodily reactions, as measured by reaction time in rating physiological response to sexual stimuli, and that meditation training increased awareness of bodily reactions by deceasing self-evaluative thoughts. This explanation draws support from evidence that training in mindfulness meditation is associated with decreases in a network of brain regions associated with mind-wandering (Christoff et al. 2009; Brewer et al. 2011; Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, and Goldstein 2012), and corresponding increased activation in visceral and somatic areas associated with body sensation (Farb et al. 2007; Farb et al. 2010). We are unaware of many of our own emotional reactions, but it is possible to train attention so as to develop emotional awareness.

Understanding mindfulness as a strategy of decreasing elaborative thought and enhancing phenomenal awareness helps to distinguish it from more cognitive strategies, such as changing how one thinks about the challenging or distressing situations one encounters in daily life. Garland and colleagues toward emphasizing the ability of mindfulness to facilitate specifically positive reappraisal, suggesting that a mindful attitude might allow individuals to reappraise a serious heart condition as "an opportunity to change their lifestyle and health behaviors rather than as a catastrophe portending imminent doom" (Garland, Gaylord, and Fredrickson 2011, 60). Traditional Buddhist presentations do not support a conception of mindfulness as biasing subjects specifically towards positive appraisal of life situations. Instead, the claim is that developed mindfulness allows subjects to 'see and know things as they are'. Affective bias underlies emotional distortions of attention and memory (Elliott et al. 2010). Judson Brewer, Hani Elwafi, and I have suggested that the role of mindfulness meditation in dispelling emotional distortions rests on its ability to attenuate positive as well as negative affective biases (Brewer, Elwafi, and Davis, forthcoming). This is a testable hypothesis; as opposed to putative biases in ethics, objective criteria in attention and memory tasks can be used to measure these more basic types of affective bias – and their attenuation in mindfulness.

If affective biases distort attention and memory, they will have impacts on the accuracy of our normative evaluations. In the case of internal states, even when we are aware of an emotional reaction, such affective biases might distort our awareness of its hedonic tone. Suppose that ill-will is actually painful, but also that in our culture ill-will towards certain groups is encouraged, in particular by the use of negative evaluative judgments about these people. Then, even if we are aware of the reaction of contempt, habituated affective biases may prevent us from attending to or accurately identifying the painful aspects of

this emotional reaction. Conversely, if mindfulness can attenuate such affective bias, this kind of present-centered attention can give subjects more accurate knowledge of the relative pain and pleasure of various types of emotional reactions.

4 The Ethics of Emotion

In Sections 2 and 3, I have argued that increasing awareness of our emotional reactions in general and decreasing distorted awareness of their hedonic valence in particular can lead to convergence on the relative hedonic weight of various emotional types. In this section, I explore some implications of this account for issues in normative ethics. Although different cultures express and inculcate diverse attitudes toward the state of ill-will, for instance, if increased clear awareness causes subjects to realize that the physiology of such internal states is strongly unpleasant, this provides a defeasible but powerful reason for agreeing that it ought not to be cultivated. Moreover, this universal ethics of emotion has substantive implications for the ethics of action and character. Take an action such as expressing ill-will towards a group of individuals because of their ethnicity or sexual orientation. If it is the case that such an action can only be performed when one is motivated by ill-will, and if it is also the case that we ought not to be motivated by ill-will, then this provides a defeasible but powerful reason for agreeing that no one ought to act in such a way.

Yet, this cannot be the whole story. Considered as an internal state, the ill-will a Holocaust survivor feels towards her persecutors may be indistinguishable from that of the homophobe, but the surivivor's ill-will has a much better justification. In this final section I address the roles of reasoned justification and emotional feelings in deciding how we ought to live.

4.1 Reason, Rationalization, and the Currency of Decisions

Work by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues suggests that when pushed back far enough, people sometimes confabulate reasons to justify their moral judgments, reasons that cannot provide justification for the specific judgments in question (Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy 2000). Nonetheless, even if subjects themselves don't have access to good reasons for holding the values they do, as theorists we can still ask whether there are good reasons to hold these values. The problem for rationalist accounts of ethics is not that reasons can't be given to justify normative claims, or even that the available justifications can't be assessed. Rather, the problem is that the criteria different people and different peoples use for assessing those reasons, and the criteria for assessing those criteria, and so on, are themselves varied and variable. Standards of what is just, for instance, vary widely. But more importantly, the weight given to issues of desert and justice relative to other issues such as respect for authority or purity of heart, for example, vary radically between cultures, subcultures, and even between Utilitarians and Kantians inhabiting similar a similar intellectual culture. This is what Prinz and John Doris term the problem of "outer pluralism" in ethics (Doris and Prinz 2009).

This challenge to universal ethical claims is paired with the problem that Doris and Prinz term "inner pluralism." As a matter of descriptive fact, individuals hold various sorts of

ethical values. Notions of duty, responsibility, and respect for others as well as expectations of pain or pleasure can be involved in determining our choices about how to live. Indeed, in many cases these various considerations compete to determine our actual choices. In order to compete in this way, importantly, there must be some common psychological currency our values share in. I follow Prinz and Jonathan Haidt, as well as Hume and James, in holding that affect provides this currency. On this approach, considering the various issues and entailments involved in a decision serves to trigger emotional reactions. Faced with a choice between smothering one's crying baby and causing the death of the whole group, the function of recruiting cognitive resources is to trigger affective responses that may compete with one's initial intuitive reaction. As Prinz (2007, 25) puts it, "we deliberate about moral dilemmas by pitting emotions against emotions." Haidt and Björklund take subjects' response to this crying baby dilemma as a paradigm case of the sort of affective reasoning described by Antonio Damasio, "there is indeed a conflict between potential responses, and additional areas of the brain become active to help resolve this conflict, but ultimately the person decides based on a feeling of rightness, rather than a deduction of some kind" (Haidt and Björklund 2008, 195). My endorsement of this claim is qualified. First, it should be clear by now that on my account we need not consciously feel a certain emotion for it to play a role in ethical decision-making. Secondly, drawing on the account of emotional reactions sketched earlier, I suggest more specifically that it is various affectively-backed preferences that are in competition when values on holding perpetrators of injustice responsible come into conflict with values against having the pain of ill-will.

4.2 Which Emotions are Worth What?

What reasoning cannot do, Prinz and I agree, is to secure the priority of certain evaluative considerations over others. Difficult decisions about how to live always involve a contest between different values. My suggestion is first that because one value we share is a preference for not being subject to pain, for pragmatic reasons, we all ought to be aware in a thorough and unbiased way of the actual sources of our pain. And I maintain, secondly, that once we pay careful attention so as to feel and know the nature and weight of our own emotional reactions, cultivating painful emotions generally won't feel worth it. Thus even if one has a sentiment in favor of ill-will towards those who commit atrocities, or especially towards those who commit atrocities towards oneself, the pleasure one takes in maintaining this emotional reaction will pale in comparison to the pain it causes. Knowing in abstract terms that ill-will harms the person who has it much more than the one to whom it is directed may not motivate change, but fully and accurately feeling the pain of ill-will, I suggest, is a powerful motivation not to cultivate it in oneself.

Returning to the case of the victim, then, on my account it is better to be compassionate towards the perpetrator than to be vengeful, because it feels better. In many cases, fierce and forceful action may be required, out of compassion for the suffering perpetrators cause themselves by acting out of painful emotional states, as well as out of compassion for the suffering of their victims. Nonetheless, there is at least a conceptual possibility that an initial, painful, perception of an agent as causing intentional harm can lead to forceful action without requiring elaborative cycles of internally agitating emotional reaction, and therefore an empirical question as to whether it does. If it is possible to cultivate

ways of being that achieve what is good more effectively than ill-will does, there is strong pragmatic sense in which that is how we ought to live.

We are also impacted by the emotions of those around us. Seeing another in pain activates areas in observers' brains associated with negative affect, for instance (Singer et al. 2004). Those fully and accurately aware of the pain of ill-will in themselves will be pained also by seeing other people consumed by ill-will, and will want people to be free from the suffering of such painful states. This gives rise to a number of crucial points.

We may express liking or dislike of certain emotional states in others and in ourselves by calling such states good or bad. However, one might like certain types of actions, traits, or states in an aesthetic sense, while being indifferent as to whether other people share these preferences. What makes ethical judgments interesting is that in such cases we are not indifferent about the preferences that others have. It is not just that we think rape or genocide are blameworthy, we also think that liking such things is blameworthy. Thus Simon Blackburn suggests that it is only when such second-order preferences dispose us to praise or critize the preferences held by others that it becomes "a public matter, something like a moral issue" (Blackburn 1998, 9). In this sense we might not only prefer that others not have certain painful emotional states, we might also prefer that they share our preference against such states, and be disposed to blame those of who lack such preferences.

Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson suggest that evaluative language functions as an interpersonal means of emotion regulation. "We use terms like 'disgusting' to do such things as criticize, persuade, or simply express disdain for others, and most generally to guide feelings—our own and other people's" (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000, 727). If this is right, evaluative language may be used to encourage others not to cultivate painful emotional states. Moreover, if it is preferences about the preferences that people have that dispose us to employ ethical language, the function of calling certain emotional states not just good but right may be to encourage people to like such states. Similarly, using the evaluative language of ethics to blame others for liking states that are objectively painful may function as an interpersonal means of encouraging preferences against such states.

This understanding of ethical evaluation, in turn, opens a way for understanding how expressions such as right and wrong can be used in a manifestation of compassion. One who feels and knows for herself the pain of objectively painful emotional states will be motivated to encourage others not to cultivate such states. One might accomplish this by explicitly telling others not to cultivate ill-will, for instance. Less explicit means may in fact be more effective, however; motivating people to change the preferences they have so as to dislike objectively painful states will not only change their relation to present emotional states but also increase their willingness to work to change their emotional dispositions. In calling ill-will wrong, one may succeed in alleviating not only other's present suffering, and not only their tendency to cause themselves harms in the future, but also their disposition to work so as not to be disposed to cause themselves the harm of painful emotional states. For one who feels and knows the pain of painful emotions, this will seem a good outcome, even the right one.

Building an account of ethical evaluation of this basis of empathy, however, also opens me up to a number of objections. For one, those endowed with of empathetic dispositions to feel the pain of others might nonetheless develop or even cultivate a disposition to feel great about causing harm, including feeling great about the bad feelings we have when seeing others pain. If my account in section 2 is cogent, however, such states inherently involve a conflict between preferences, a conflict that is painful in itself. Moreover, it if proves possible to have more purely pleasurable emotional states, that would be better.

Nonetheless, an ethics focused primarily on emotion rather than action may have nothing to say about why Stalin ought not to have had millions of his citizens murdered, if he was not in fact motivated by painful emotions such as fear or ill-will. Perhaps some psychopaths feel purely and simply great in carrying out atrocities. I don't think this is a weakness in the theory. We don't play the morality game with dangerous reptiles; the thing to do with a loose Tyrannosaurus Rex is not to evaluative his actions as atrocious, but simply to contain the threat. Similarly, towards those otherwise human but utterly lacking in the basic emotional building blocks of morality, the appropriate response is containment, rather than punishment or other sorts of blame.

On the more positive end, because we are pained by others' pain, to the degree we allow ourselves to feel this pain we will be motivated to do what we can to create alleviate this suffering. Thus we will be motivated to act so as to stop people from causing pain to others, but also to themselves. If I am right, one primary way people cause pain to themselves is by cultivating painful types of emotional reactions. If so, we ought to be motivated to encourage others not to engage in cultivating painful emotions, or in acting out of them.

I have suggested that for those who are fully and accurately aware of their own emotions, ill-will won't feel worth it. Even if it does turn out that in some rare and particular cases, cultivating painful emotions has instrumental value, still, there will be vanishingly few cases in which a community of such ideal-observers of emotions will be motivated to encourage ill-will across the board, by maintaining a general norm in favor of such emotional reactions. Indeed, on my account, in some cases rationalizing norms in favor of the cultivation of painful emotions may itself be blameworthy.

5 Conclusion

Perhaps victims of rape or genocide ought to feel anger and ill-will towards their aggressors, at least for a while. Anger may be important for the psychological resolution of such traumas, and on my account there can be cases where painful emotions are instrumentally valuable. Nonetheless, for anger to be instrumentally valuable is for it to be a means to an end that is good and right. Some cultures may not value resolving the trauma of rape, or may not value it sufficiently to allow victims to feel or express anger. Indeed, this is likely the case in places where women are stoned to death for the putative crime of being raped. The challenge of moral relativism is the suggestion that there is no universal fact that causing that sort of trauma is the wrong thing to do, or that resolving the pain of trauma is the right thing to do. Prinz's moral relativism offers us no way independently of the idiosyncratic preferences and values held by the particular culture a rape victim finds her-

self in to answer the question of whether she ought to allow herself to be stoned to death or instead ought to be angry. My aim in this paper has been to push back against this sort of moral relativism from a plausible metaphysics of morals, establishing that there are some universal ethical ends to which anger, in particular cases, might be a means.

REFERENCES

Berkovich-Ohana, Aviva, Joseph Glicksohn, and Abraham Goldstein. 2012. “Mindfulness-induced Changes in Gamma Band Activity – Implications for the Default Mode Network, Self-reference and Attention.” *Clinical Neurophysiology* 123 (4) (April): 700–710. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2011.07.048.

Blackburn, S. 1998. *Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA.

Block, N. 1995. “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (18): 227–47.

———. 2005. “Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 9 (2) (February): 46–52. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006.

———. 2007. “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 30 (5-6): 481– 548. doi:10.1017/S0140525X07002786.

Brewer, Judson A, Hani M. Elwafi, and Jake H. Davis. “Craving to Quit: Psychological Models and Neurobiological Mechanisms of Mindfulness Training as Treatment for Addictions.” *Psychology of Additive Behaviors*.

Brewer, Judson A, Patrick D Worhunsky, Jeremy R Gray, Yi-Yuan Tang, Jochen Weber, and Hedy Kober. 2011. “Meditation Experience Is Associated with Differences in Default Mode Network Activity and Connectivity.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108 (50) (December 13): 20254–20259. doi:10.1073/pnas.1112029108.

Christoff, K., A. M Gordon, J. Smallwood, R. Smith, and J. W Schooler. 2009. “Experience Sampling During fMRI Reveals Default Network and Executive System Contributions to Mind Wandering.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106 (21): 8719.

Colombetti, G. 2005. “Appraising Valence.” *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12* 8 (10): 103–126.

D’Arms, J., and D. Jacobson. 2000. “Sentiment and Value.” *Ethics* 110 (4): 722–748.

Dehaene, Stanislas, and Lionel Naccache. 2001. “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework.” *Cognition* 79 (1-2): 1–37.

Desimone, R., and J. Duncan. 1995. “Neural Mechanisms of Selective Visual Attention.” *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 18 (1): 193–222.

Doris, J.M., and J.J. Prinz. 2009. “Experiments in Ethics.” *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (October 3).

Elliott, Rebecca, Roland Zahn, J F William Deakin, and Ian M Anderson. 2010. “Affective Cognition and Its Disruption in Mood Disorders.” *Neuropsychopharmacology* 36 (1) (June 23): 153. doi:10.1038/npp.2010.77.

Fan, Jin, Jennie Byrne, Michael S Worden, Kevin G Guise, Bruce D McCandliss, John Fossella, and Michael I Posner. 2007. “The Relation of Brain Oscillations to Attentional Networks.” *The Journal of Neuroscience* 27 (23) (June 6): 6197–6206. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1833-07.2007.

Fan, Jin, Bruce D. McCandliss, John Fossella, Jonathan I. Flombaum, and Michael I. Posner. 2005. "The Activation of Attentional Networks." *NeuroImage* 26 (2) (June): 471–479. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.02.004.

Fan, Jin, Bruce D. McCandliss, Tobias Sommer, Amir Raz, and Michael I. Posner. 2002. "Testing the Efficiency and Independence of Attentional Networks." *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 14 (3): 340–347. doi:10.1162/089892902317361886.

Farb, N. A. S., A. K. Anderson, H. Mayberg, J. Bean, D. McKeon, and Z. V. Segal. 2010. "Minding One's Emotions: Mindfulness Training Alters the Neural Expression of Sadness." *Emotion* 10 (1): 25–33.

Farb, N. A. S., Z. V. Segal, H. Mayberg, J. Bean, D. McKeon, Z. Fatima, and A. K. Anderson. 2007. "Attending to the Present: Mindfulness Meditation Reveals Distinct Neural Modes of Self-reference." *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience* 2 (4): 313.

Haidt, J. 2007. "The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology." *Science* 316 (5827): 998.

Haidt, J., and F. Björklund. 2008. "Social Intuitionists Reason, in Conversation." *Moral Psychology* 2: 241–254.

Haidt, J., F. Bjorklund, and S. Murphy. 2000. "Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No Reason." *Unpublished Manuscript, University of Virginia*.

Lambie, J. A, and A. J. Marcel. 2002. "Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A Theoretical Framework." *Psychological Review* 109 (2): 219–259.

LeDoux, J. E. 2000. "Emotion Circuits in the Brain." *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 23: 155–184.

Loewenstein, G., and J. S. Lerner. 2003. "The Role of Affect in Decision Making." In *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, ed. R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer, and H.H. Goldsmith. Oxford University Press, USA.

Nagel, T. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* 83 (4): 435–450.

Parvizi, J., and A. Damasio. 2001. "Consciousness and the Brainstem." *Cognition* 79 (1-2): 135–160.

Prinz, Jesse J. 2004. *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2005a. "A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness." *Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement*: 381–396.

———. 2005b. "Are Emotions Feelings?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12* 8 (10): 9–25.

———. 2007. *The Emotional Construction of Morals*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2010. "When Is Perception Conscious?" In *Perceiving the World: New Essays on Perception*, ed. B. Nanay, 310–332. New York: Oxford University Press.

Silverstein, R. Gina, Anne-Catharine H. Brown, Harold D. Roth, and Willoughby B. Britton. 2011. "Effects of Mindfulness Training on Body Awareness to Sexual Stimuli: Implications for Female Sexual Dysfunction." *Psychosomatic Medicine* 73 (9) (December): 817 –825. doi:10.1097/PSY.0b013e318234e628.

Singer, Tania, Ben Seymour, John O'Doherty, Holger Kaube, Raymond J Dolan, and Chris D Frith. 2004. "Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain." *Science* 303 (5661) (February 20): 1157–1162. doi:10.1126/science.1093535.

Sze, Jocelyn A., Anett Gyurak, Joyce W. Yuan, and Robert W. Levenson. 2010. "Coherence Between Emotional Experience and Physiology: Does Body Awareness Training Have an Impact?" *Emotion* 10: 803–814. doi:10.1037/a0020146.